S Matthew Liao
S. Matthew Liao
Scroll
Director of the Center for Bioethics
Arthur Zitrin Professor of Bioethics
-
Professional overview
-
Dr. Matthew Liao uses the tools of philosophy to study and examine the ramifications of novel biomedical innovations.
A speaker at TEDxCERN, Dr. Liao discussed whether it is ethical for someone to erase certain aspects of their memories and how doing so might affect that individual's identity. He has also given a TED talk in New York and been featured in the New York Times, The Atlantic, The Guardian, and other numerous media outlets.
The author and editor of four books, Dr. Liao provides the academic community with a collection of human rights essays. In The Right to be Loved, he explores the philosophical foundations underpinning children's right to be loved, and proposes that we reconceptualize our policies concerning adoptions so that individuals who are not romantically linked can co-adopt a child together.
Dr. Liao provides students with an education grounded in a broad conception of bioethics encompassing both medical and environmental ethics. He offers students the opportunity to explore the intersection of human rights practice with central domains of public health and regularly teaches normative theory and neuroethics. His courses address how the rightness or wrongness of an act is determined and ethical issues arising out of new medical technologies such as embryonic stem cell research, cloning, artificial reproduction, and genetic engineering; ethical issues raised by the development and use of neuroscientific technologies such as the ethics of erasing traumatic memories; the ethics of mood and cognitive enhancements; and moral and legal implications of "mind-reading" technologies for brain privacy.
To learn more about Dr. Liao and his work, visit his website and blog.
-
Education
-
AB, Politics (Magna Cum Laude), Princeton University, Princeton, NJDPhil, Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
-
Honors and awards
-
Outstanding Academic Title, The Right to Be Loved, Choice Review (2016)TEDx Speaker at CERN, Geneva, Switzerland (2015)TEDx Speaker, New York, NY (2013)Humanities Grant Initiative, NYU (2011)Big Think Delphi Fellow (2011)
-
Areas of research and study
-
BioethicsEpistemologyMetaphysicsMoral Psychology
-
Publications
Publications
Rightholding, Demandingness of Love, and Parental Licensing
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2017Journal title
Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume
94Issue
3Page(s)
762-769Abstract~Selecting Children: The Ethics of Reproductive Genetic Engineering
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
Philosophy CompassVolume
3Issue
5Page(s)
973-991Abstract~The Ashley treatment : Best interests, convenience, and parental decision-making
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., Savulescu, J., & Sheehan, M. (n.d.).Publication year
2007Journal title
Hastings Center ReportVolume
37Issue
2Page(s)
16-20Abstract~The basis of human moral status
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2010Journal title
Journal of Moral PhilosophyVolume
7Issue
2Page(s)
159-179AbstractWhen philosophers consider what moral status human beings have, they tend to find themselves either supporting the idea that not all human beings are rightholders or adopting what Peter Singer calls a 'speciesist' position, where speciesism is defined as morally favoring a particular species-in this case, human beings-over others without sufficient justification. In this paper, I develop what I call the 'genetic basis for moral agency' account of rightholding, and I propose that this account can allow all human beings to be rightholders without being speciesist. While my aim is to set out this account clearly rather than to defend it, I explain how this account is different from a potentiality account and I argue that it is preferable to an actual moral agency account of human moral status.The basis of human moral status
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.). (T. Brooks, Ed.).Publication year
2011Page(s)
335-356Abstract~The buck-passing account of value : Lessons from Crisp
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2010Journal title
Philosophical StudiesVolume
151Issue
3Page(s)
421-432AbstractT. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the conceptual priority of reasons or the right vis-à-vis value or the good. I conclude by addressing some of the broader implications of my arguments for the current debate about the buck-passing account of value.The Closeness Problem and the Doctrine of Double Effect : A Way Forward
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2016Journal title
Criminal Law and PhilosophyVolume
10Issue
4Page(s)
849-863AbstractA major challenge to the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is the concern that an agent’s intention can be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from a putative example of an intended harm, and yet, the resulting case appears to be a case of impermissibility. This is the so-called “closeness problem.” Many people believe that one can address the closeness problem by adopting Warren Quinn’s version of the DDE, call it DDE*, which distinguishes between harmful direct agency and harmful indirect agency. In this paper, I first argue that Quinn’s DDE* is just as vulnerable to the closeness problem as the DDE is. Second, some might think that what we should therefore do is give up on intentions altogether and move towards some kind of non-state-of-mind, victim-based deontology. I shall argue against this move and explain why intentions are indispensable to an adequate nonconsequentialist theory. Finally, I shall propose a new way of answering the closeness problem.The duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., Sheehan, M., & Clarke, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
American Journal of BioethicsVolume
9Issue
8Page(s)
24-32AbstractParticipants in some clinical trials are at risk of being harmed and sometimes are seriously harmed as a result of not being provided with available, relevant risk information. We argue that this situation is unacceptable and that there is a moral duty to disclose all adverse clinical trial results to participants in clinical trials. This duty is grounded in the human right not to be placed at risk of harm without informed consent. We consider objections to disclosure grounded in considerations of commercial interest, and we argue that these concerns are insufficient to override the moral duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results. However, we also develop a proposal that enables commercial interests to be protected, while promoting the duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results.The Embryo Rescue Case
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2006Journal title
Theoretical Medicine and BioethicsVolume
27Issue
2Page(s)
141-147AbstractIn the debate regarding the moral status of human embryos, the Embryo Rescue Case has been used to suggest that embryos are not rightholders. This case is premised on the idea that in a situation where one has a choice between saving some number of embryos or a child, it seems wrong to save the embryos and not the child. If so, it seems that embryos cannot be rightholders. In this paper, I argue that the Embryo Rescue Case does not independently show that embryos are not rightholders.The ethics of enhancement
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., Savulescu, J., & Wasserman, D. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
Journal of Applied PhilosophyVolume
25Issue
3Page(s)
159-161Abstract~The ethics of using genetic engineering for sex selection
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2005Journal title
Journal of Medical EthicsVolume
31Issue
2Page(s)
116-118AbstractIt is quite likely that parents will soon be able to use genetic engineering to select the sex of their child by directly manipulating the sex of an embryo. Some might think that this method would be a more ethical method of sex selection than present technologies such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) because, unlike PGD, it does not need to create and destroy "wrong gendered" embryos. This paper argues that those who object to present technologies on the grounds that the embryo is a person are unlikely to be persuaded by this proposal, though for different reasons.The genetic account of moral status : A defense
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Journal of Moral PhilosophyVolume
9Issue
2Page(s)
265-277AbstractChristopher Grau argues that the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding is problematic because it fails to grant all human beings the moral status of rightholding; it grants the status of rightholding to entities that do not intuitively deserve such status; and it assumes that the genetic basis for moral agency has intrinsic/final value, but the genetic basis for moral agency only has instrumental value. Grau also argues that those who are inclined to hold that all human beings are rightholders should reconsider speciesism. In this paper, I argue that Grau's objections do not undermine the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding, and I also offer criticisms of Grau's defense of speciesism.The Grounds of Ancillary Care Duties
AbstractLiao, S. M., Matthew Liao, S., & O’neil, C. (n.d.).Publication year
2016Page(s)
29-42AbstractWhether and to what extent researchers have ‘ancillary care duties’ to address the unmet needs they encounter among their research participants is a relatively recent issue in research ethics. Much of the debate has focused on ‘special’ ancillary care duties, which hold uniquely between researchers and participants. There is disagreement about the grounds and precise scope of these special duties, but they are generally thought to pick up where the general duty of easy rescue leaves off. But easy rescue is not, we contend, the only possible general ground of ancillary care duties. In this chapter, we develop a novel human rights approach to ancillary care duties that, like easy rescue, is general but that may differ from it in terms of scope and demandingness. Only those needs that must be met to satisfy the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life qua human beings, not merely qua individuals, fall within the scope of this human right.The Grounds of Ancillary Care Duties
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., O’Neil, C., Liao, S. M., & O’Neil, C. (n.d.).Publication year
2017Page(s)
29-42Abstract~The idea of a duty to love
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2006Journal title
Journal of Value InquiryVolume
40Issue
1Page(s)
1-22Abstract~The Loop Case and Kamm's Doctrine of Triple Effect
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
Philosophical StudiesVolume
146Issue
2Page(s)
223-231AbstractJudith Jarvis Thomson's Loop Case is particularly significant in normative ethics because it questions the validity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of Double Effect, according to which there is a significant difference between harm that is intended and harm that is merely foreseen and not intended. Recently, Frances Kamm has argued that what she calls the Doctrine of Triple Effect (DTE), which draws a distinction between acting because-of and acting in-order-to, can account for our judgment about the Loop Case. In this paper, I first argue that even if the distinction drawn by DTE can be sustained, it does not seem to apply to the Loop Case. Moreover, I question whether this distinction has any normative significance. The upshot is that I am skeptical that DTE can explain our judgment about the Loop Case.The Moral Status and Rights of Artificial Intelligence
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2020Page(s)
480-503AbstractAs AIs acquire greater capacities, the issue of whether AIs would acquire greater moral status becomes salient. This chapter sketches a theory of moral status and considers what kind of moral status an AI could have. Among other things, the chapter argues that AIs that are alive, conscious, or sentient, or those that can feel pain, have desires, and have rational or moral agency should have the same kind of moral status as entities that have the same kind of intrinsic properties. It also proposes that a sufficient condition for an AI to have human-level moral status and be a rightsholder is when an AI has the physical basis for moral agency. This chapter also considers what kind of rights a rightsholding AI could have and how AIs could have greater than human-level moral status.The Normativity of Memory Modification
AbstractLiao, S. M., Sandberg, A., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
NeuroethicsVolume
1Issue
2Page(s)
85-99Abstract~The organism view defended
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Matthew Liao, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2006Journal title
MonistVolume
89Issue
3Page(s)
334-350Abstract~The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights: An Overview
AbstractLiao, S. M., Cruft, R., Liao, S. M., Renzo, M., Cruft, R., Liao, S. M., & Renzo, M. (n.d.).Publication year
2015Page(s)
1-44Abstract~The Place of Philosophy in Bioethics Today
AbstractLiao, S. M., Blumenthal-Barby, J., Aas, S., Brudney, D., Flanigan, J., Liao, S. M., London, A., Sumner, W., & Savulescu, J. (n.d.).Publication year
2022Journal title
American Journal of BioethicsVolume
22Issue
12Page(s)
10-21Abstract~The right of children to be loved
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Page(s)
347-363Abstract~The right of children to be loved
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2013Page(s)
347-363Abstract~The Right of Children to Be Loved
AbstractAbstractThis chapter aims to satisfy critics of rights who believe correctly that rights should not be claimed without consideration as to whether they can be justified. To restrict the scope of the chapter, it assumes the following: there are rights, in particular human rights; children, even very young ones, can have rights; and there are positive rights. The chapter proposes that this right can be grounded as a human right and by showing that love can be an appropriate object of a duty. Furthermore, it also challenges the common notion that the duty to love a child belongs only to the biological parents. If the right of children to be loved is in fact a human right grounded in the fact that children need to be loved to develop essential capacities needed for a good life, then we, as a society, also need to accept part of the duty to promote a child's being loved as our responsibility.