S Matthew Liao
S. Matthew Liao
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Director of the Center for Bioethics
Arthur Zitrin Professor of Bioethics
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Professional overview
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Dr. Matthew Liao uses the tools of philosophy to study and examine the ramifications of novel biomedical innovations.
A speaker at TEDxCERN, Dr. Liao discussed whether it is ethical for someone to erase certain aspects of their memories and how doing so might affect that individual's identity. He has also given a TED talk in New York and been featured in the New York Times, The Atlantic, The Guardian, and other numerous media outlets.
The author and editor of four books, Dr. Liao provides the academic community with a collection of human rights essays. In The Right to be Loved, he explores the philosophical foundations underpinning children's right to be loved, and proposes that we reconceptualize our policies concerning adoptions so that individuals who are not romantically linked can co-adopt a child together.
Dr. Liao provides students with an education grounded in a broad conception of bioethics encompassing both medical and environmental ethics. He offers students the opportunity to explore the intersection of human rights practice with central domains of public health and regularly teaches normative theory and neuroethics. His courses address how the rightness or wrongness of an act is determined and ethical issues arising out of new medical technologies such as embryonic stem cell research, cloning, artificial reproduction, and genetic engineering; ethical issues raised by the development and use of neuroscientific technologies such as the ethics of erasing traumatic memories; the ethics of mood and cognitive enhancements; and moral and legal implications of "mind-reading" technologies for brain privacy.
To learn more about Dr. Liao and his work, visit his website and blog.
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Education
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AB, Politics (Magna Cum Laude), Princeton University, Princeton, NJDPhil, Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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Honors and awards
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Outstanding Academic Title, The Right to Be Loved, Choice Review (2016)TEDx Speaker at CERN, Geneva, Switzerland (2015)TEDx Speaker, New York, NY (2013)Humanities Grant Initiative, NYU (2011)Big Think Delphi Fellow (2011)
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Areas of research and study
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BioethicsEpistemologyMetaphysicsMoral Psychology
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Publications
Publications
Why children need to be loved
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Matthew Liao, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Critical Review of International Social and Political PhilosophyVolume
15Issue
3Page(s)
347-358AbstractI have argued elsewhere that children have a moral right to be loved. Mhairi Cowden challenges my arguments. Among other things, Cowden believes that children do not need to be loved. In this paper, I explain why Cowdens arguments fail and offer additional evidence for why children need to be loved.After Prozac
AbstractLiao, S. M., Savulescu, J., Meulen, (Ruud H., Kahane, G., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2011Page(s)
245-256Abstract~Bias and Reasoning: Haidt’s Theory of Moral Judgment
AbstractLiao, S. M., Brooks, T., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2011Page(s)
108-127Abstract~Parental Love Pills : Some Ethical Considerations
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2011Journal title
BioethicsVolume
25Issue
9Page(s)
489-494AbstractIt may soon be possible to develop pills that allow parents to induce in themselves more loving behaviour, attitudes and emotions towards their children. In this paper, I consider whether pharmacologically induced parental love can satisfy reasonable conditions of authenticity; why anyone would be interested in taking such parental love pills at all, and whether inducing parental love pharmacologically promotes narcissism or results in self-instrumentalization. I also examine how the availability of such pills may affect the duty to love a child.The basis of human moral status
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.). (T. Brooks, Ed.).Publication year
2011Page(s)
335-356Abstract~Time-relative interests and abortion
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.). (T. Brooks, Ed.).Publication year
2011Page(s)
317-333Abstract~Agency and human rights
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Matthew Liao, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2010Journal title
Journal of Applied PhilosophyVolume
27Issue
1Page(s)
15-25AbstractWhat grounds human rights? How do we determine that something is a human right? James Griffin has persuasively argued that the notion of agency should determine the content of human rights. However, Griffin’s agency account faces the question of why agency should be the sole ground for human rights. For example, can Griffin’s notion of agency by itself adequately explain such human rights as that against torture? Or, has Griffin offered a plausible explanation as to why one should not broaden the ground for human rights to include other elements of a good life such as freedom from great pain, understanding, deep personal relations, and so on? These concerns have been raised regarding Griffin’s agency account, but in his new book, On Human Rights, Griffin has offered new arguments in support of his view that agency is the sole ground for human rights. In this paper, I examine these new arguments, and I argue that Griffin’s arguments are ultimately unsuccessful.The basis of human moral status
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2010Journal title
Journal of Moral PhilosophyVolume
7Issue
2Page(s)
159-179AbstractWhen philosophers consider what moral status human beings have, they tend to find themselves either supporting the idea that not all human beings are rightholders or adopting what Peter Singer calls a 'speciesist' position, where speciesism is defined as morally favoring a particular species-in this case, human beings-over others without sufficient justification. In this paper, I develop what I call the 'genetic basis for moral agency' account of rightholding, and I propose that this account can allow all human beings to be rightholders without being speciesist. While my aim is to set out this account clearly rather than to defend it, I explain how this account is different from a potentiality account and I argue that it is preferable to an actual moral agency account of human moral status.The buck-passing account of value : Lessons from Crisp
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2010Journal title
Philosophical StudiesVolume
151Issue
3Page(s)
421-432AbstractT. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the conceptual priority of reasons or the right vis-à-vis value or the good. I conclude by addressing some of the broader implications of my arguments for the current debate about the buck-passing account of value.Twinning, inorganic replacement, and the organism view
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2010Journal title
RatioVolume
23Issue
1Page(s)
59-72AbstractIn explicating his version of the Organism View, Eric Olson argues that you begin to exist only after twinning is no longer possible and that you cannot survive a process of inorganic replacement. Assuming the correctness of the Organism View, but pace Olson, I argue in this paper that the Organism View does not require that you believe either proposition. The claim I shall make about twinning helps to advance a debate that currently divides defenders of the Organism View, while the claim I shall make about inorganic replacement will help to put the Organism View on a par with its rival views by allowing it to accommodate a plausible intuition that its rivals can accommodate, namely, the intuition that you can survive a process of inorganic replacement. Both claims, I shall also argue, are important for those who are interested in the identity condition of a human organism, even if they do not hold the view that you are essentially an organism.Disclosing clinical trial results : Publicity, significance and independence
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., Sheehan, M., & Clarke, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
American Journal of BioethicsVolume
9Issue
8Page(s)
W3-W5Abstract~Is there a duty to share genetic information?
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
Journal of Medical EthicsVolume
35Issue
5Page(s)
306-309AbstractA number of prominent bioethicists, such as Parker, Lucassen and Knoppers, have called for the adoption of a system in which by default genetic information is shared among family members. This paper suggests that a main reason given in support of this call to share genetic information among family members is the idea that genetic information is essentially familial in nature. On examining this "familial nature of genetics" argument, the paper shows that most genetic information is only shared in a weaker way among family members and does not necessarily lead to the actual manifestation of particular diseases. The upshot is that the idea that genetic information is familial in nature does not provide sufficient ground for moving towards a system in which by default genetic information is shared among family members.The duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., Sheehan, M., & Clarke, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
American Journal of BioethicsVolume
9Issue
8Page(s)
24-32AbstractParticipants in some clinical trials are at risk of being harmed and sometimes are seriously harmed as a result of not being provided with available, relevant risk information. We argue that this situation is unacceptable and that there is a moral duty to disclose all adverse clinical trial results to participants in clinical trials. This duty is grounded in the human right not to be placed at risk of harm without informed consent. We consider objections to disclosure grounded in considerations of commercial interest, and we argue that these concerns are insufficient to override the moral duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results. However, we also develop a proposal that enables commercial interests to be protected, while promoting the duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results.The Loop Case and Kamm's Doctrine of Triple Effect
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
Philosophical StudiesVolume
146Issue
2Page(s)
223-231AbstractJudith Jarvis Thomson's Loop Case is particularly significant in normative ethics because it questions the validity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of Double Effect, according to which there is a significant difference between harm that is intended and harm that is merely foreseen and not intended. Recently, Frances Kamm has argued that what she calls the Doctrine of Triple Effect (DTE), which draws a distinction between acting because-of and acting in-order-to, can account for our judgment about the Loop Case. In this paper, I first argue that even if the distinction drawn by DTE can be sustained, it does not seem to apply to the Loop Case. Moreover, I question whether this distinction has any normative significance. The upshot is that I am skeptical that DTE can explain our judgment about the Loop Case.The right of children to be loved
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Page(s)
347-363Abstract~The role of animal models in evaluating reasonable safety and efficacy for human trials of cell-based interventions for neurologic conditions
AbstractLiao, S. M., Regenberg, A., Mathews, D. J., Blass, D. M., Bok, H., Coyle, J. T., Duggan, P., Faden, R., Finkel, J., Gearhart, J. D., Hillis, A., Hoke, A., Johnson, R., Johnston, M., Kahn, J., Kerr, D., King, P., Kurtzberg, J., Liao, S. M., … Traystman, R. J. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
Journal of Cerebral Blood Flow and MetabolismVolume
29Issue
1Page(s)
1-9AbstractProgress in regenerative medicine seems likely to produce new treatments for neurologic conditions that use human cells as therapeutic agents; at least one trial for such an intervention is already under way. The development of cell-based interventions for neurologic conditions (CBI-NCs) will likely include preclinical studies using animals as models for humans with conditions of interest. This paper explores predictive validity challenges and the proper role for animal models in developing CBI-NCs. In spite of limitations, animal models are and will remain an essential tool for gathering data in advance of first-in-human clinical trials. The goal of this paper is to provide a realistic lens for viewing the role of animal models in the context of CBI-NCs and to provide recommendations for moving forward through this challenging terrain.Unintended changes in cognition, mood, and behavior arising from cell-based interventions for neurological conditions : Ethical challenges
AbstractLiao, S. M., Duggan, P. S., Siegel, A. W., Blass, D. M., Bok, H., Coyle, J. T., Faden, R., Finkel, J., Gearhart, J. D., Greely, H. T., Hillis, A., Hoke, A., Johnson, R., Johnston, M., Kahn, J., Kerr, D., King, P., Kurtzberg, J., Liao, S. M., … Mathews, D. J. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
American Journal of BioethicsVolume
9Issue
5Page(s)
31-36AbstractThe prospect of using cell-based interventions (CBIs) to treat neurological conditions raises several important ethical and policy questions. In this target article, we focus on issues related to the unique constellation of traits that characterize CBIs targeted at the central nervous system. In particular, there is at least a theoretical prospect that these cells will alter the recipients' cognition, mood, and behavior-brain functions that are central to our concept of the self. The potential for such changes, although perhaps remote, is cause for concern and careful ethical analysis. Both to enable better informed consent in the future and as an end in itself, we argue that early human trials of CBIs for neurological conditions must monitor subjects for changes in cognition, mood, and behavior; further, we recommend concrete steps for that monitoring. Such steps will help better characterize the potential risks and benefits of CBIs as they are tested and potentially used for treatment.A defense of intuitions
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
Philosophical StudiesVolume
140Issue
2Page(s)
247-262AbstractRadical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists' challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts.Cell-based interventions for neurologic conditions : Ethical challenges for early human trials
AbstractLiao, S. M., Mathews, D. J., Sugarman, J., Bok, H., Blass, D. M., Coyle, J. T., Duggan, P., Finkel, J., Greely, H. T., Hillis, A., Hoke, A., Johnson, R., Johnston, M., Kahn, J., Kerr, D., Kurtzberg, J., Liao, S. M., McDonald, J. W., McKhann, G., … Faden, R. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
NeurologyVolume
71Issue
4Page(s)
288-293AbstractBackground: Attempts to translate basic stem cell research into treatments for neurologic diseases and injury are well under way. With a clinical trial for one such treatment approved and in progress in the United States, and additional proposals under review, we must begin to address the ethical issues raised by such early forays into human clinical trials for cell-based interventions for neurologic conditions. Methods: An interdisciplinary working group composed of experts in neuroscience, cell biology, bioethics, law, and transplantation, along with leading disease researchers, was convened twice over 2 years to identify and deliberate on the scientific and ethical issues raised by the transition from preclinical to clinical research of cell-based interventions for neurologic conditions. Results: While the relevant ethical issues are in many respects standard challenges of human subjects research, they are heightened in complexity by the novelty of the science, the focus on the CNS, and the political climate in which the science is proceeding. Conclusions: Distinctive challenges confronting US scientists, administrators, institutional review boards, stem cell research oversight committees, and others who will need to make decisions about work involving stem cells and their derivatives and evaluate the ethics of early human trials include evaluating the risks, safety, and benefits of these trials, determining and evaluating cell line provenance, and determining inclusion criteria, informed consent, and the ethics of conducting early human trials in the public spotlight. Further study and deliberation by stakeholders is required to move toward professional and institutional policies and practices governing this research.Issues in the pharmacological induction of emotions
AbstractLiao, S. M., Wasserman, D., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
Journal of Applied PhilosophyVolume
25Issue
3Page(s)
178-192AbstractIn this paper, we examine issues raised by the possibility of regulating emotions through pharmacological means. We argue that emotions induced through these means can be authentic phenomenologically, and that the manner of inducing them need not make them any less our own than emotions arising ‘naturally’. We recognize that in taking drugs to induce emotions, one may lose opportunities for self-knowledge; act narcissistically; or treat oneself as a mere means. But we propose that there are circumstances in which none of these concerns arise. Finally, we consider how the possibility of drug-regulation might affect duties to feel emotions.Selecting Children: The Ethics of Reproductive Genetic Engineering
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
Philosophy CompassVolume
3Issue
5Page(s)
973-991Abstract~The ethics of enhancement
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., Savulescu, J., & Wasserman, D. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
Journal of Applied PhilosophyVolume
25Issue
3Page(s)
159-161Abstract~The Normativity of Memory Modification
AbstractLiao, S. M., Sandberg, A., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
NeuroethicsVolume
1Issue
2Page(s)
85-99Abstract~Who Is Afraid of Numbers?
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
UtilitasVolume
20Issue
04Page(s)
447-461Abstract~Ethical and policy issues relating to progenitor-cell-based strategies for prevention of atherosclerosis
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., Goldschmidt, P. J., Sugarman, J., Bok, H., Brown, H., Alta Charo, R., Faden, R., Hare, J., Kahn, J., Kurtzberg, J., Manton, K. G., Moreno, J., Shanawani, H., Sulmasy, D. P., Taylor, H., & Zoloth, L. (n.d.).Publication year
2007Journal title
Journal of Medical EthicsVolume
33Issue
11Page(s)
643-646AbstractObjective: To examine important ethical and societal issues relating to the use of progenitor-cell-based strategies for disease prevention, particularly atherosclerosis. Background: Several nascent lines of evidence suggest the feasibility of using progenitor cells to reverse the health consequence of atherosclerosis. Such potential uses of progenitor cells are scientifically exciting, yet they raise important ethical and societal issues. Method: The Working Group on Ethics of Progenitor Cell-based Strategies for Disease Prevention met to discuss the relevant issues. Several drafts of a report were then circulated to the entire Working Group for comments until a consensus was reached. Results: Scientific evidence suggests the appropriateness of using progenitor-cell-based strategies for some rare conditions involving atherosclerosis, but additional preclinical data are needed for other, more prevalent conditions before human trials begin. All such trials raise a set of ethical issues, especially since trials aimed at prevention rather than treatment may involve persons who do not yet have disease but will be exposed to the risks of interventions. In addition, enrolment in prevention trials may be hazardous and harmful if participants erroneously believe experimental interventions will necessarily prevent disease. Finally, given the high prevalence of atherosclerosis, there are some important public policy implications of taking such an approach to prevention, including the sources of progenitor cells for such interventions as well as the allocation of health resources. Conclusion: Potential uses of progenitor-cell-based strategies for preventing atherosclerosis must be considered in the context of a range of social and ethical issues.