S Matthew Liao
S. Matthew Liao
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Director of the Center for Bioethics
Arthur Zitrin Professor of Bioethics
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Professional overview
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Dr. Matthew Liao uses the tools of philosophy to study and examine the ramifications of novel biomedical innovations.
A speaker at TEDxCERN, Dr. Liao discussed whether it is ethical for someone to erase certain aspects of their memories and how doing so might affect that individual's identity. He has also given a TED talk in New York and been featured in the New York Times, The Atlantic, The Guardian, and other numerous media outlets.
The author and editor of four books, Dr. Liao provides the academic community with a collection of human rights essays. In The Right to be Loved, he explores the philosophical foundations underpinning children's right to be loved, and proposes that we reconceptualize our policies concerning adoptions so that individuals who are not romantically linked can co-adopt a child together.
Dr. Liao provides students with an education grounded in a broad conception of bioethics encompassing both medical and environmental ethics. He offers students the opportunity to explore the intersection of human rights practice with central domains of public health and regularly teaches normative theory and neuroethics. His courses address how the rightness or wrongness of an act is determined and ethical issues arising out of new medical technologies such as embryonic stem cell research, cloning, artificial reproduction, and genetic engineering; ethical issues raised by the development and use of neuroscientific technologies such as the ethics of erasing traumatic memories; the ethics of mood and cognitive enhancements; and moral and legal implications of "mind-reading" technologies for brain privacy.
To learn more about Dr. Liao and his work, visit his website and blog.
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Education
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AB, Politics (Magna Cum Laude), Princeton University, Princeton, NJDPhil, Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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Honors and awards
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Outstanding Academic Title, The Right to Be Loved, Choice Review (2016)TEDx Speaker at CERN, Geneva, Switzerland (2015)TEDx Speaker, New York, NY (2013)Humanities Grant Initiative, NYU (2011)Big Think Delphi Fellow (2011)
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Areas of research and study
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BioethicsEpistemologyMetaphysicsMoral Psychology
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Publications
Publications
Ethics review of big data research : What should stay and what should be reformed?
AbstractLiao, S. M., Ferretti, A., Ienca, M., Sheehan, M., Blasimme, A., Dove, E. S., Farsides, B., Friesen, P., Kahn, J., Karlen, W., Kleist, P., Liao, S. M., Nebeker, C., Samuel, G., Shabani, M., Rivas Velarde, M., & Vayena, E. (n.d.).Publication year
2021Journal title
BMC Medical EthicsVolume
22Issue
1AbstractBackground: Ethics review is the process of assessing the ethics of research involving humans. The Ethics Review Committee (ERC) is the key oversight mechanism designated to ensure ethics review. Whether or not this governance mechanism is still fit for purpose in the data-driven research context remains a debated issue among research ethics experts. Main text: In this article, we seek to address this issue in a twofold manner. First, we review the strengths and weaknesses of ERCs in ensuring ethical oversight. Second, we map these strengths and weaknesses onto specific challenges raised by big data research. We distinguish two categories of potential weakness. The first category concerns persistent weaknesses, i.e., those which are not specific to big data research, but may be exacerbated by it. The second category concerns novel weaknesses, i.e., those which are created by and inherent to big data projects. Within this second category, we further distinguish between purview weaknesses related to the ERC’s scope (e.g., how big data projects may evade ERC review) and functional weaknesses, related to the ERC’s way of operating. Based on this analysis, we propose reforms aimed at improving the oversight capacity of ERCs in the era of big data science. Conclusions: We believe the oversight mechanism could benefit from these reforms because they will help to overcome data-intensive research challenges and consequently benefit research at large.Eva Feder Kittay, Love's Labor
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2000Volume
20Issue
4Page(s)
261-63Abstract~Genetic Information, the Principle of Rescue, and Special Obligations
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., & Mackenzie, J. (n.d.).Publication year
2018Journal title
Hastings Center ReportVolume
48Issue
3Page(s)
18-19AbstractIn “Genetic Privacy, Disease Prevention, and the Principle of Rescue,” Madison Kilbride argues that patients have a duty to warn biological family members about clinically actionable adverse genetic findings. The duty does not stem from the special obligations that we may have to family members, she argues, but rather follows from the principle of rescue, which she understands as the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of harm to another person when the expected harm is serious and the cost or risk to oneself is sufficiently moderate. We doubt, however, whether the principle of rescue can ground a duty to warn in the cases Kilbride envisages, and we suggest that Kilbride may have underappreciated the role that special obligations could play in generating a duty to warn family members.Health (care) and human rights : a fundamental conditions approach
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2016Journal title
Theoretical Medicine and BioethicsVolume
37Issue
4Page(s)
259-274AbstractMany international declarations state that human beings have a human right to health care. However, is there a human right to health care? What grounds this right, and who has the corresponding duties to promote this right? Elsewhere, I have argued that human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. Drawing on this fundamental conditions approach of human rights, I offer a novel way of grounding a human right to health care.Human Engineering and Climate Change
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., Sandberg, A., & Roache, R. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Ethics, Policy and EnvironmentVolume
15Issue
2Page(s)
206-221AbstractAnthropogenic climate change is arguably one of the biggest problems that confront us today. There is ample evidence that climate change is likely to affect adversely many aspects of life for all people around the world, and that existing solutions such as geoengineering might be too risky and ordinary behavioural and market solutions might not be sufficient to mitigate climate change. In this paper, we consider a new kind of solution to climate change, what we call human engineering, which involves biomedical modifications of humans so that they can mitigate and/or adapt to climate change. We argue that human engineering is potentially less risky than geoengineering and that it could help behavioural and market solutions succeed in mitigating climate change. We also consider some possible ethical concerns regarding human engineering such as its safety, the implications of human engineering for our children and society, and we argue that these concerns can be addressed. Our upshot is that human engineering deserves further consideration in the debate about climate change.Human Rights and Public Health Ethics
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2019Volume
35Page(s)
9-20Abstract~Human Rights and Public Health Ethics
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., Mastroianni, A. C., Kahn, J. P., & Kass, N. E. (n.d.).Publication year
2019AbstractThis chapter relates human rights to public health ethics and policies by discussing the nature and moral justification of human rights generally, and the right to health in particular. Which features of humanity ground human rights? To answer this question, as an alternative to agency and capabilities approaches, the chapter offers the ???fundamental conditions approach,??? according to which human rights protect the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. The fundamental conditions approach identifies ???basic health??????the adequate functioning of the various parts of our organism needed for the development and exercise of the fundamental capacities???as the object of a human right. A human right to basic health entails human rights to the essential resources for promoting and maintaining basic health, including adequate nutrition, basic health care, and basic education. Dutybearers include every able person in appropriate circumstances, as well as governments and government agencies, private philanthropic foundations, and transnational corporations.Human Rights as Fundamental Conditions for a Good Life
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2015Abstract~Intentions and moral permissibility : The case of acting permissibly with bad intentions
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Matthew Liao, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Law and PhilosophyVolume
31Issue
6Page(s)
703-724AbstractMany people believe in the intention principle, according to which an agent's intention in performing an act can sometimes make an act that would otherwise have been permissible impermissible, other things being equal. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon have offered cases that seem to show that it can be permissible for an agent to act even when the agent has bad intentions. If valid, these cases would seem to cast doubt on the intention principle. In this paper, I point out that these cases have confounding factors that have received little attention in the literature. I argue that these confounding factors undermine the putative force of these cases against the intention principle. Indeed, when cases without these confounding factors are considered, it becomes clear, so I argue, that intentions can be relevant for the permissibility of an act.Is there a duty to share genetic information?
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
Journal of Medical EthicsVolume
35Issue
5Page(s)
306-309AbstractA number of prominent bioethicists, such as Parker, Lucassen and Knoppers, have called for the adoption of a system in which by default genetic information is shared among family members. This paper suggests that a main reason given in support of this call to share genetic information among family members is the idea that genetic information is essentially familial in nature. On examining this "familial nature of genetics" argument, the paper shows that most genetic information is only shared in a weaker way among family members and does not necessarily lead to the actual manifestation of particular diseases. The upshot is that the idea that genetic information is familial in nature does not provide sufficient ground for moving towards a system in which by default genetic information is shared among family members.Issues in the pharmacological induction of emotions
AbstractLiao, S. M., Wasserman, D., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2008Journal title
Journal of Applied PhilosophyVolume
25Issue
3Page(s)
178-192AbstractIn this paper, we examine issues raised by the possibility of regulating emotions through pharmacological means. We argue that emotions induced through these means can be authentic phenomenologically, and that the manner of inducing them need not make them any less our own than emotions arising ‘naturally’. We recognize that in taking drugs to induce emotions, one may lose opportunities for self-knowledge; act narcissistically; or treat oneself as a mere means. But we propose that there are circumstances in which none of these concerns arise. Finally, we consider how the possibility of drug-regulation might affect duties to feel emotions.Kids Deserve Privacy Online. They’re Not Getting It.
Liao, S. M., & Passos Ferreira, C. (n.d.).Lives, Limbs, and Liver Spots : The Threshold Approach to Limited Aggregation
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., & Lim, J. E. (n.d.).Publication year
2024Journal title
UtilitasVolume
36Issue
2Page(s)
148-167AbstractLimited Aggregation is the view that when there are competing moral claims that demand our attention, we should sometimes satisfy the largest aggregate of claims, depending on the strength of the claims in question. In recent years, philosophers such as Patrick Tomlin and Alastair Norcross have argued that Limited Aggregation violates a number of rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency. Current versions of Limited Aggregation are what may be called Comparative Approaches because they involve assessing the relative strengths of various claims. In this paper, we offer a non-comparative version of Limited Aggregation, what we call the Threshold Approach. It states that there is a non-relative threshold that separates various claims. We demonstrate that the Threshold Approach does not violate rational choice principles such as Transitivity, Separability, and Contraction Consistency, and we show that potential concerns regarding such a view are surmountable.Moral brains : the neuroscience of morality
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2016Abstract~Morality and Neuroscience: Past and Future
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2016Abstract~Navigating the Complexities of AI and Digital Governance: A 5W1H Framework
AbstractLiao, S. M., Cheung, K., & Matalon, T. (n.d.).Publication year
2025Abstract~Neuroethical concerns about moderating traumatic memories
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., & Wasserman, D. T. (n.d.).Publication year
2007Journal title
American Journal of BioethicsVolume
7Issue
9Page(s)
38-40Abstract~Neuroscience and Ethics : Assessing Greene's Epistemic Debunking Argument Against Deontology
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2017Journal title
Experimental PsychologyVolume
64Issue
2Page(s)
82-92AbstractA number of people believe that results from neuroscience have the potential to settle seemingly intractable debates concerning the nature, practice, and reliability of moral judgments. In particular, Joshua Greene has argued that evidence from neuroscience can be used to advance the long-standing debate between consequentialism and deontology. This paper first argues that charitably interpreted, Greene's neuroscientific evidence can contribute to substantive ethical discussions by being part of an epistemic debunking argument. It then argues that taken as an epistemic debunking argument, Greene's argument falls short in undermining deontological judgments. Lastly, it proposes that accepting Greene's methodology at face value, neuroimaging results may in fact call into question the reliability of consequentialist judgments. The upshot is that Greene's empirical results do not undermine deontology and that Greene's project points toward a way by which empirical evidence such as neuroscientific evidence can play a role in normative debates.Parental Love Pills : Some Ethical Considerations
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2011Journal title
BioethicsVolume
25Issue
9Page(s)
489-494AbstractIt may soon be possible to develop pills that allow parents to induce in themselves more loving behaviour, attitudes and emotions towards their children. In this paper, I consider whether pharmacologically induced parental love can satisfy reasonable conditions of authenticity; why anyone would be interested in taking such parental love pills at all, and whether inducing parental love pharmacologically promotes narcissism or results in self-instrumentalization. I also examine how the availability of such pills may affect the duty to love a child.Philosophical foundations of human rights
AbstractLiao, S. M., Cruft, R., Renzo, M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.). (First edition.).Publication year
2015Abstract~Political and naturalistic conceptions of human rights : A false polemic?
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., & Etinson, A. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Journal of Moral PhilosophyVolume
9Issue
3Page(s)
327-352AbstractWhat are human rights? According to one longstanding account, the Naturalistic Conception of human rights, human rights are those that we have simply in virtue of being human. In recent years, however, a new and purportedly alternative conception of human rights has become increasingly popular. This is the so-called Political Conception of human rights, the proponents of which include John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz. In this paper we argue for three claims. First, we demonstrate that Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights can accommodate two of the most salient concerns that proponents of the Political Conception have raised about them. Second, we argue that the theoretical distance between Naturalistic and Political Conceptions is not as great as it has been made out to be. Finally, we argue that a Political Conception of human rights, on its own, lacks the resources necessary to determine the substantive content of human rights. If we are right, not only should the Naturalistic Conception not be rejected, the Political Conception is in fact incomplete without the theoretical resources that a Naturalistic Conception characteristically provides. These three claims, in tandem, provide a fresh and largely conciliatory perspective on the ongoing debate between proponents of Political and Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights.Précis for The Right to Be Loved
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2017Journal title
Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume
94Issue
3Page(s)
738-742Abstract~Putting the trolley in order : Experimental philosophy and the loop case
AbstractLiao, S. M., Liao, S. M., Wiegmann, A., Alexander, J., & Vong, G. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Philosophical PsychologyVolume
25Issue
5Page(s)
661-671AbstractIn recent years, a number of philosophers have conducted empirical studies that survey people's intuitions about various subject matters in philosophy. Some have found that intuitions vary accordingly to seemingly irrelevant facts: facts about who is considering the hypothetical case, the presence or absence of certain kinds of content, or the context in which the hypothetical case is being considered. Our research applies this experimental philosophical methodology to Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous Loop Case, which she used to call into question the validity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of Double Effect. We found that intuitions about the Loop Case vary according to the context in which the case is considered. We contend that this undermines the supposed evidential status of intuitions about the Loop Case. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for philosophers who rely on the Loop Case to make philosophical arguments and for philosophers who use intuitions in general.Rescuing human embryonic stem cell research : The blastocyst transfer method
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2005Journal title
American Journal of BioethicsVolume
5Issue
6Page(s)
8-16AbstractDespite the therapeutic potential of human embryonic stem (HES) cells, many people believe that HES cell research should be banned. The reason is that the present method of extracting HES cells involves the destruction of the embryo, which for many is the beginning of a person. This paper examines a number of compromise solutions such as parthenogenesis, the use of defective embryos, genetically creating a "pseudo embryo" that can never form a placenta, and determining embryo death, and argues that none of these proposals are likely to satisfy embryoists, that is, those who regard the embryo as a person. This paper then proposes a method of extracting HES cells, what might be called the Blastocyst Transfer Method, that meets the ethical requirements of embryoists, and it considers some possible concerns regarding this method. It concludes by encouraging future HES cell research to investigate this method.Response to commentators on "Rescuing human embryonic stem cell research : The blastocyst transfer method" [1]
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2005Journal title
American Journal of BioethicsVolume
5Issue
6Page(s)
W10-W13Abstract~