S Matthew Liao
S. Matthew Liao
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Director of the Center for Bioethics
Arthur Zitrin Professor of Bioethics
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Professional overview
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Dr. Matthew Liao uses the tools of philosophy to study and examine the ramifications of novel biomedical innovations.
A speaker at TEDxCERN, Dr. Liao discussed whether it is ethical for someone to erase certain aspects of their memories and how doing so might affect that individual's identity. He has also given a TED talk in New York and been featured in the New York Times, The Atlantic, The Guardian, and other numerous media outlets.
The author and editor of four books, Dr. Liao provides the academic community with a collection of human rights essays. In The Right to be Loved, he explores the philosophical foundations underpinning children's right to be loved, and proposes that we reconceptualize our policies concerning adoptions so that individuals who are not romantically linked can co-adopt a child together.
Dr. Liao provides students with an education grounded in a broad conception of bioethics encompassing both medical and environmental ethics. He offers students the opportunity to explore the intersection of human rights practice with central domains of public health and regularly teaches normative theory and neuroethics. His courses address how the rightness or wrongness of an act is determined and ethical issues arising out of new medical technologies such as embryonic stem cell research, cloning, artificial reproduction, and genetic engineering; ethical issues raised by the development and use of neuroscientific technologies such as the ethics of erasing traumatic memories; the ethics of mood and cognitive enhancements; and moral and legal implications of "mind-reading" technologies for brain privacy.
To learn more about Dr. Liao and his work, visit his website and blog.
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Education
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AB, Politics (Magna Cum Laude), Princeton University, Princeton, NJDPhil, Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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Honors and awards
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Outstanding Academic Title, The Right to Be Loved, Choice Review (2016)TEDx Speaker at CERN, Geneva, Switzerland (2015)TEDx Speaker, New York, NY (2013)Humanities Grant Initiative, NYU (2011)Big Think Delphi Fellow (2011)
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Areas of research and study
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BioethicsEpistemologyMetaphysicsMoral Psychology
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Publications
Publications
Human Rights as Fundamental Conditions for a Good Life
Liao, S. M. (n.d.). In Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, (1–).Publication year
2015Philosophical foundations of human rights
Cruft, R., Renzo, M., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.). (First edition., 1–).Publication year
2015The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights: An Overview
Liao, S. M., Cruft, R., & Renzo, M. (n.d.). In Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (1–).Publication year
2015The Right to be Loved
Liao, S. M. (n.d.). (1–).Publication year
2015Editorial
Matthew Liao, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2013Journal title
Journal of Moral PhilosophyVolume
10Issue
1Page(s)
1-2The right of children to be loved
Liao, S. M. (n.d.). In What is Right for Children? (1–).Publication year
2013Page(s)
347-363Human Engineering and Climate Change
AbstractLiao, S. M., Sandberg, A., & Roache, R. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Ethics, Policy and EnvironmentVolume
15Issue
2Page(s)
206-221AbstractAnthropogenic climate change is arguably one of the biggest problems that confront us today. There is ample evidence that climate change is likely to affect adversely many aspects of life for all people around the world, and that existing solutions such as geoengineering might be too risky and ordinary behavioural and market solutions might not be sufficient to mitigate climate change. In this paper, we consider a new kind of solution to climate change, what we call human engineering, which involves biomedical modifications of humans so that they can mitigate and/or adapt to climate change. We argue that human engineering is potentially less risky than geoengineering and that it could help behavioural and market solutions succeed in mitigating climate change. We also consider some possible ethical concerns regarding human engineering such as its safety, the implications of human engineering for our children and society, and we argue that these concerns can be addressed. Our upshot is that human engineering deserves further consideration in the debate about climate change.Intentions and moral permissibility: The case of acting permissibly with bad intentions
AbstractMatthew Liao, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Law and PhilosophyVolume
31Issue
6Page(s)
703-724AbstractMany people believe in the intention principle, according to which an agent's intention in performing an act can sometimes make an act that would otherwise have been permissible impermissible, other things being equal. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon have offered cases that seem to show that it can be permissible for an agent to act even when the agent has bad intentions. If valid, these cases would seem to cast doubt on the intention principle. In this paper, I point out that these cases have confounding factors that have received little attention in the literature. I argue that these confounding factors undermine the putative force of these cases against the intention principle. Indeed, when cases without these confounding factors are considered, it becomes clear, so I argue, that intentions can be relevant for the permissibility of an act.Political and naturalistic conceptions of human rights: A false polemic?
AbstractLiao, S. M., & Etinson, A. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Journal of Moral PhilosophyVolume
9Issue
3Page(s)
327-352AbstractWhat are human rights? According to one longstanding account, the Naturalistic Conception of human rights, human rights are those that we have simply in virtue of being human. In recent years, however, a new and purportedly alternative conception of human rights has become increasingly popular. This is the so-called Political Conception of human rights, the proponents of which include John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz. In this paper we argue for three claims. First, we demonstrate that Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights can accommodate two of the most salient concerns that proponents of the Political Conception have raised about them. Second, we argue that the theoretical distance between Naturalistic and Political Conceptions is not as great as it has been made out to be. Finally, we argue that a Political Conception of human rights, on its own, lacks the resources necessary to determine the substantive content of human rights. If we are right, not only should the Naturalistic Conception not be rejected, the Political Conception is in fact incomplete without the theoretical resources that a Naturalistic Conception characteristically provides. These three claims, in tandem, provide a fresh and largely conciliatory perspective on the ongoing debate between proponents of Political and Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights.Putting the trolley in order: Experimental philosophy and the loop case
AbstractLiao, S. M., Wiegmann, A., Alexander, J., & Vong, G. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Philosophical PsychologyVolume
25Issue
5Page(s)
661-671AbstractIn recent years, a number of philosophers have conducted empirical studies that survey people's intuitions about various subject matters in philosophy. Some have found that intuitions vary accordingly to seemingly irrelevant facts: facts about who is considering the hypothetical case, the presence or absence of certain kinds of content, or the context in which the hypothetical case is being considered. Our research applies this experimental philosophical methodology to Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous Loop Case, which she used to call into question the validity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of Double Effect. We found that intuitions about the Loop Case vary according to the context in which the case is considered. We contend that this undermines the supposed evidential status of intuitions about the Loop Case. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for philosophers who rely on the Loop Case to make philosophical arguments and for philosophers who use intuitions in general.The genetic account of moral status: A defense
AbstractLiao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Journal of Moral PhilosophyVolume
9Issue
2Page(s)
265-277AbstractChristopher Grau argues that the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding is problematic because it fails to grant all human beings the moral status of rightholding; it grants the status of rightholding to entities that do not intuitively deserve such status; and it assumes that the genetic basis for moral agency has intrinsic/final value, but the genetic basis for moral agency only has instrumental value. Grau also argues that those who are inclined to hold that all human beings are rightholders should reconsider speciesism. In this paper, I argue that Grau's objections do not undermine the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding, and I also offer criticisms of Grau's defense of speciesism.Why children need to be loved
AbstractMatthew Liao, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2012Journal title
Critical Review of International Social and Political PhilosophyVolume
15Issue
3Page(s)
347-358AbstractI have argued elsewhere that children have a moral right to be loved. Mhairi Cowden challenges my arguments. Among other things, Cowden believes that children do not need to be loved. In this paper, I explain why Cowdens arguments fail and offer additional evidence for why children need to be loved.After Prozac
Savulescu, J., Meulen, (Ruud H. J., Kahane, G., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.). In Enhancing Human Capacities (1–).Publication year
2011Page(s)
245-256Bias and Reasoning: Haidt’s Theory of Moral Judgment
Brooks, T., & Liao, S. M. (n.d.). In New Waves in Ethics (1–).Publication year
2011Page(s)
108-127Parental Love Pills: Some Ethical Considerations
AbstractLiao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2011Journal title
BioethicsVolume
25Issue
9Page(s)
489-494AbstractIt may soon be possible to develop pills that allow parents to induce in themselves more loving behaviour, attitudes and emotions towards their children. In this paper, I consider whether pharmacologically induced parental love can satisfy reasonable conditions of authenticity; why anyone would be interested in taking such parental love pills at all, and whether inducing parental love pharmacologically promotes narcissism or results in self-instrumentalization. I also examine how the availability of such pills may affect the duty to love a child.The basis of human moral status
Liao, S. M. (n.d.). In T. Brooks (Ed.), Ethics and Moral Philosophy (1–).Publication year
2011Page(s)
335-356Time-relative interests and abortion
Liao, S. M. (n.d.). In T. Brooks (Ed.), Ethics and Moral Philosophy (1–).Publication year
2011Page(s)
317-333Agency and human rights
AbstractMatthew Liao, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2010Journal title
Journal of Applied PhilosophyVolume
27Issue
1Page(s)
15-25AbstractWhat grounds human rights? How do we determine that something is a human right? James Griffin has persuasively argued that the notion of agency should determine the content of human rights. However, Griffin’s agency account faces the question of why agency should be the sole ground for human rights. For example, can Griffin’s notion of agency by itself adequately explain such human rights as that against torture? Or, has Griffin offered a plausible explanation as to why one should not broaden the ground for human rights to include other elements of a good life such as freedom from great pain, understanding, deep personal relations, and so on? These concerns have been raised regarding Griffin’s agency account, but in his new book, On Human Rights, Griffin has offered new arguments in support of his view that agency is the sole ground for human rights. In this paper, I examine these new arguments, and I argue that Griffin’s arguments are ultimately unsuccessful.The basis of human moral status
AbstractLiao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2010Journal title
Journal of Moral PhilosophyVolume
7Issue
2Page(s)
159-179AbstractWhen philosophers consider what moral status human beings have, they tend to find themselves either supporting the idea that not all human beings are rightholders or adopting what Peter Singer calls a 'speciesist' position, where speciesism is defined as morally favoring a particular species-in this case, human beings-over others without sufficient justification. In this paper, I develop what I call the 'genetic basis for moral agency' account of rightholding, and I propose that this account can allow all human beings to be rightholders without being speciesist. While my aim is to set out this account clearly rather than to defend it, I explain how this account is different from a potentiality account and I argue that it is preferable to an actual moral agency account of human moral status.The buck-passing account of value: Lessons from Crisp
AbstractLiao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2010Journal title
Philosophical StudiesVolume
151Issue
3Page(s)
421-432AbstractT. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the conceptual priority of reasons or the right vis-à-vis value or the good. I conclude by addressing some of the broader implications of my arguments for the current debate about the buck-passing account of value.Twinning, inorganic replacement, and the organism view
AbstractLiao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2010Journal title
RatioVolume
23Issue
1Page(s)
59-72AbstractIn explicating his version of the Organism View, Eric Olson argues that you begin to exist only after twinning is no longer possible and that you cannot survive a process of inorganic replacement. Assuming the correctness of the Organism View, but pace Olson, I argue in this paper that the Organism View does not require that you believe either proposition. The claim I shall make about twinning helps to advance a debate that currently divides defenders of the Organism View, while the claim I shall make about inorganic replacement will help to put the Organism View on a par with its rival views by allowing it to accommodate a plausible intuition that its rivals can accommodate, namely, the intuition that you can survive a process of inorganic replacement. Both claims, I shall also argue, are important for those who are interested in the identity condition of a human organism, even if they do not hold the view that you are essentially an organism.Disclosing clinical trial results: Publicity, significance and independence
Liao, S. M., Sheehan, M., & Clarke, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
American Journal of BioethicsVolume
9Issue
8Page(s)
W3-W5Is there a duty to share genetic information?
AbstractLiao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
Journal of Medical EthicsVolume
35Issue
5Page(s)
306-309AbstractA number of prominent bioethicists, such as Parker, Lucassen and Knoppers, have called for the adoption of a system in which by default genetic information is shared among family members. This paper suggests that a main reason given in support of this call to share genetic information among family members is the idea that genetic information is essentially familial in nature. On examining this "familial nature of genetics" argument, the paper shows that most genetic information is only shared in a weaker way among family members and does not necessarily lead to the actual manifestation of particular diseases. The upshot is that the idea that genetic information is familial in nature does not provide sufficient ground for moving towards a system in which by default genetic information is shared among family members.The duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results
AbstractLiao, S. M., Sheehan, M., & Clarke, S. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
American Journal of BioethicsVolume
9Issue
8Page(s)
24-32AbstractParticipants in some clinical trials are at risk of being harmed and sometimes are seriously harmed as a result of not being provided with available, relevant risk information. We argue that this situation is unacceptable and that there is a moral duty to disclose all adverse clinical trial results to participants in clinical trials. This duty is grounded in the human right not to be placed at risk of harm without informed consent. We consider objections to disclosure grounded in considerations of commercial interest, and we argue that these concerns are insufficient to override the moral duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results. However, we also develop a proposal that enables commercial interests to be protected, while promoting the duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results.The Loop Case and Kamm's Doctrine of Triple Effect
AbstractLiao, S. M. (n.d.).Publication year
2009Journal title
Philosophical StudiesVolume
146Issue
2Page(s)
223-231AbstractJudith Jarvis Thomson's Loop Case is particularly significant in normative ethics because it questions the validity of the intuitively plausible Doctrine of Double Effect, according to which there is a significant difference between harm that is intended and harm that is merely foreseen and not intended. Recently, Frances Kamm has argued that what she calls the Doctrine of Triple Effect (DTE), which draws a distinction between acting because-of and acting in-order-to, can account for our judgment about the Loop Case. In this paper, I first argue that even if the distinction drawn by DTE can be sustained, it does not seem to apply to the Loop Case. Moreover, I question whether this distinction has any normative significance. The upshot is that I am skeptical that DTE can explain our judgment about the Loop Case.